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From the Cheris to Chennai: Dalit Politics in Tamil Nadu 
 
Hugo Gorringe 
 
In 1999 the largest Dalit movement in Tamil Nadu, the Liberation Panthers, ended their 
decade long boycott of elections and contested elections. In the 14 years since they have 
struggled to establish themselves as political players. During fieldwork in 2012, one of 
the main concerns of the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK - Liberation Panther 
Party) was to become a ‘mainstream’ party. Thirumavalavan, the party leader, 
emphasised that the party tended to be marginalised and sidelined as a ‘Dalit’ party. He 
therefore outlined an ambitious attempt to change the constituency and make up of the 
party so that it was no longer perceived as a Dalit organisation. Institutionalisation, this 
reminds us, is not a simple step but an ongoing process. Entering elections has compelled 
the VCK to change in terms of structure, members, rules and tactics. Not all of these 
changes have been welcomed by cadres, nor have they necessarily benefited the party in 
obvious ways. Drawing on ethnographic work with party activists and affiliates this 
paper teases apart the complexities of institutionalisation for Dalit parties in south India. 
 
 
Introduction 
Insurgency is always short-lived. Once it subsides and the people leave the streets, most 
of the organisations which it temporarily threw up and which elites helped to nurture 
simply fade away. As for the few organisations that survive, it is because they become 
more useful to those who control the resources on which they depend than to the lower 
class groups which the organisations claim to represent (Piven and Cloward 1979: xxi). 
 
In 1999, after a decade of socio-political mobilisation, grassroots activism and 
widespread consciousness-raising, the largest Dalit party in Tamil Nadu – the Viduthalai 
Chiruthaigal Katchi (VCK – Liberation Panther Party) decided to enter the political 
process and contest elections. The ideological clarity of the new party and the close ties 
between leaders and led invited optimism amongst a range of commentators. Writing in 
Frontline, noted political analyst Viswanathan (1999) saw the development ‘as having 
the potential to bring about substantial changes not only of electoral politics in the state, 
but in the nature of political activism in general and the approach of mainstream political 
parties to organisations that represent Dalits’ aspirations’. Similarly, I portrayed them as 
‘redrawing the political map of Tamil Nadu’ (Gorringe 2005: 301). 
 
The rise of Dalit parties in the state seemed to offer another instance of caste-based 
mobilisation expanding the political mainstream and democratising Indian democracy. 
Whilst India’s democratic system has struggled to accommodate oppositional 
movements, according to Lakha and Taneja (2009: 316) the recent upsurge of lower caste 
(Dalit and ‘Other Backward Caste’) groups is reshaping political institutions. Indeed, 
these authors describe the political accommodation and electoral successes of such 
movements as ‘a seismic shift in patterns of political participation and structures of 
power’ (ibid. 317). Certainly, autonomous Dalit parties have kept caste discrimination on 
the agenda, held authorities to account and gained impressive electoral victories. The 
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Bahujan Samaj Party’s (Majority People’s Party) formation of several governments at the 
state-level in India’s most populous state of Uttar Pradesh (Pai 2002), led some 
commentators to identify a ‘Dalit revolution’ in northern India (Jaffrelot 2003) even 
before it won an unparalleled Assembly majority in 2007. 
 
Carried away on a tide of radical rhetoric and the emergence of novel actors, it was easy 
to envision social change. Even at the zenith of movement activism, however, there were 
indications that the transition to political participation would be neither smooth nor rapid 
for the representatives of the lowest castes and classes. Internal opposition to the VCK’s 
political ambitions was abundant and vociferous. As one party stalwart put it: 
 
If you rear a calf with pigs, then the calf too will eat shit. That is why we reject 
politics. We can protest and gain from that – we can fight the governments from the 
outside. If the calf joins the piglets then the two become one and you cannot 
distinguish between them – both fall into the gutter (Subramani Interview, April 
1999). 
 
Captured here are both the radical activists’ perception of politics as tainted, and 
recognition of the influence that the prevalent political culture can have on emergent 
organisations. Optimistic accounts of the Dalit parties arguably downplayed these deep-
seated institutional impediments to change. Returning to Tamil Nadu a decade on from 
the entry into politics this paper draws on ethnographic data to offer an analysis of the 
VCK’s ongoing process of institutionalisation1. The paper charts the VCKs gradual 
inclusion into and participation within political institutions before analysing the impact 
that this has had on how they organise and what they are able to demand in the political 
sphere. We conclude by questioning whether institutionalisation has shorn the panthers of 
their radicalism or whether they retain the capacity for autonomous action. We begin, 
however, with an overview of the theoretical work on institutionalisation and social 
movements that places this case within a wider context. 
 
Institutionalising Contentious Politics 
Institutionalisation here refers to the process by which movements move from extra-
institutional action to more formal engagement with and action within formal politics and 
the institutions of interest mediation. A range of social movement theorists regard 
institutionalisation as an almost inevitable stage within a ‘protest cycle’, but there is 
disagreement as to whether it represents the ‘success’ of a movement and the socio-
political recognition of its concerns and influence, or whether it signals a movement’s 
demise as a radical group due to an increasing preoccupation with bureaucratic processes, 
resource mobilisation and self-preservation (Hensby, Sibthorpe & Driver 2012). Some 
see integration into political institutions as the end-goal of extra-institutional mobilisation 
(Gamson 1990; Offe 1990), whilst others see it a form of demobilisation and de-
radicalisation (Coy & Hedeen 2005). The two perspectives, of course, may co-exist 
within any group. As Offe (1990) notes, movements are usually divided into pragmatists 
and idealists. The former perceive the formation of formal organisations with due-paying 
members and clear structures of leadership as a means of sustaining activist concerns. By 
                                                          
1 Data was collected over 10 months in 2012 during ESRC (Grant RES-062-23-3348) funded 
fieldwork in and around Madurai District, central Tamil Nadu. 
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contrast, the idealists - ‘fundis’ in Offe’s terms - ‘refuse to join the institutional learning 
process’ and bemoan the loss of autonomy, spontaneity and specificity that accompanies 
increasing formalisation (1990: 249-250).  
 
Political theorists such as Meyer and Tarrow (1998) argue that activism can become a 
vocation for cadre. Given the inevitable ebbs and flows of mobilisation, therefore, such 
activists seek to professionalize and advocate for their concerns on a more stable footing. 
Indeed, a range of studies illustrate the benefits of institutionalisation in terms of 
obtaining vital resources (McCarthy & Zald 1977), influencing policy changes (Kriesi 
2004), or creating further opportunities for mobilisation (Pettinichio 2012). Large 
organisations, however, operate according to a different logic to social movements. They 
require members, infrastructure, a division of labour and resources. In their study of 
Social Movement Organisations, therefore, Jordan and Maloney (1997) argue that the 
quest for bureaucratic stability and efficiency sees the focus on radical action and change 
give way to recruitment drives and campaigns to raise money.  
 
A corollary process witnesses a decline of mass activism in favour of professional 
activists who organise events or engage in mediated stunts on behalf of the more passive 
membership. Whilst Jordan and Maloney focus on ‘protest businesses’, the focus here is 
on what we might call ‘protest parties’. Such parties, however, experience similar 
compulsions to businesses: they need to expand beyond the core constituency to have an 
impact, they need to secure resources to wage electoral campaigns and they need to 
attract the votes of significant numbers of people to stand any chance of winning 
(Poguntke 1993). This latter objective may entail the dilution or neglect of key movement 
demands in favour of broader or more general appeals, or it may result in pragmatic 
electoral alliances with other parties with all the negotiations, compromises and possible 
decline in mobilisation entailed (Maguire 1995). 
 
Drawing on their work in Latin America, Petras and Veltmeyer (2006: 91) describe 
‘electoral politics as a trap’ designed to clip the wings of political opponents. They argue 
that entry into the party system invariably results in de-radicalisation. This finding is 
echoed in much of the social movement literature in which, as Pettinicchio (2012: 501) 
notes, institutionalisation generally has a ‘negative connotation’. Tarrow (1998: 208) 
argues that movements which adopt ‘institutional routines, can become imbued with their 
logic and values’. Others, however, maintain that institutionalisation need not lead to goal 
displacement or de-radicalisation and that formal movement organisations can secure 
gains and concessions from the political system (Staggenborg 1988; Clemens & Minkoff 
2004). 
 
As regards process of institutionalisation in Tamil politics, the dominant political parties 
in the state have established a template for both how political challengers enter political 
institutions, and what it means to ‘do politics’ (Gorringe 2011). Successive challengers in 
the state have entered politics following mobilisation that has legitimised both extra-
institutional action and caste based politics. This template is widely recognised. As 
Thirumavalavan, leader of the VCK, told cadres at a party meeting: 
 
If we look at the political history of Tamil Nadu, most of the parties that emerged in 
the past twenty years or so perceive politics as a tool to get political power - to get 
power you need caste support, to get caste support you need caste feelings, if you 
provoke caste feelings you will get caste support, and if you get caste support you 
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will get power. This is the perspective of political parties, of most of the political 
parties that emerged in the past twenty years in Tamil Nadu. They form, first, caste-
based organisations, then, convert them into political parties (Speech, April 2012). 
 
Racine (2009) similarly notes how caste dominates political calculations surrounding 
which candidates to field and which constituencies to address. This is one reason why the 
proportion of reserved jobs for ‘Backward’ and ‘Scheduled’ Castes is so high in the state 
– exceeding the Supreme Court ceiling of 50% by a considerable margin at 69% (Racine 
2009; Ziegfeld 2013). The political mobilisation of lower castes in Tamil Nadu has, to 
this extent, has succeeded. This benchmark, however, means that there is limited scope 
for emerging parties to lobby for further concessions. There is, as Racine puts it, ‘a gap 
between successful agitations by a caste association and their political dividends’ (2009: 
470). In part this is because of the absolute dominance of the two Dravidian parties who 
have not gained less that 67% of seats in the Legislative Assembly in the ten elections 
since 1971 (Racine 2009: 454).  
 
The emergence of non-Dravidian challengers, as Wyatt (2009) notes, has not displaced 
the Dravidian duopoly but forced these parties into a range of alliances. Political 
recognition in Tamil Nadu, therefore, takes the form of an alliance with one or other of 
the main parties rather than an ability to stand alone. Roberts (2010) argues that the Dalit 
parties have successfully weaned Dalit votes away from the main parties, but given that 
they have done so by forging alliances with those parties the gains are marginal (Gorringe 
2011). Most critiques – or celebrations – of the party have focused on their performance 
in politics but, as Jaoul (2007) notes, Dalit politics has an impact in the social as well as 
political spheres.  
 
Institutionalisation, this suggests, occurs on multiple levels and in various registers. There 
is a need, therefore, to analyse the broader processes of socio-political institutionalisation 
in which radical groups are inducted into a particular political culture replete with its own 
norms, attitudes and ways of doing things. In what follows, therefore, this paper focuses 
on the wider processes through which the party has been institutionalised into Tamil 
ways of doing politics. Institutionalisation, it is argued, is not a clear cut event. Entering 
electoral politics, as Aminzade (1995) observes, can co-exist with an informal and 
decentralised organisational structure and need not (initially at least) lead to formalisation 
and professionalisation. Electoral contestation, similarly, does not necessarily mark the 
end of extra-institutional agitation. Institutionalisation, thus, must be understood as a 
process. It is to this process of change amongst the Panthers that we now turn. 
 
Institutionalising Rebellion 
The VCK entered politics for multiple reasons. There were the ‘push’ factors of 
repression, marginalisation and alienation from the masses (Gorringe 2005). During its 
radical mobilisation phase, the Panthers were portrayed as an extremist organisation and 
faced political repression. Launching a party, therefore, was about establishing their 
democratic credentials as much as anything else. Alongside this, however, there are also 
‘pull’ factors. Firstly, as Palshikar (2013: 10) notes, any new party also ‘thinks it can 
break the monopoly of the “established” parties and gatecrash into the system’. True to 
this goal, the VCK first competed as part of a Third Front led by the Tamil Maanila 
Congress (Tamil State Congress) in a bid to contest Dravidian hegemony. Wyatt (2009: 
127) notes, however, that political structures in the state conspire against emergent and 
poorly resourced parties. Given the first past the post system, the bipolar nature of Tamil 
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politics means that parties require a significant vote-share to win. The VCK, has not been 
able to do this independently (Gorringe 2005; Wyatt 2009). Shortly after its initial foray 
into electoral politics, therefore, the VCK allied with one of the main Dravidian parties 
and has contested elections in one or other of the main fronts since 2001. Their autonomy 
has been constrained both by a lack of resources and through the strategies of the 
dominant. In an echo of Petras and Veltmeyer (2006), Punitha Pandian – editor of the 
long-running Dalit Murasu (Dalit Drum) – saw politics as a trap. He recounted an 
instance in the late 1990s – at the height of VCK mobilisation - when the Deputy General 
of Police called Thirumavalavan into a meeting: 
 
It is a conspiracy. If any revolutionary type figure - any element who seems like 
they might destroy the varnashrama, brahminic order – emerges, then they try and 
inveigle them into politics. That is what the DGP himself said: “Why don’t you start 
a party Thirumavalavan? … Come and speak in the Assembly, it will be in the 
papers. Now no one pays attention. In the house, Karunanidhi will have to respond. 
Why do you remain outside, speaking like a naxalite? Come to the system.” This 
did not happen over one or two days, but was a long process of brain-washing. He 
said: “Why do you come and complain to me that he was arrested or he was beaten? 
Become an MLA and then give me a call. I’ll come to your house” (Pandian 
Interview, April 2012).  
 
VCK activists and leaders in Madurai recounted instances in which Thirumavalavan was 
arrested and intimidated (Fieldnotes 2012). They recalled the cases filed against them and 
the sea of police at any demonstration, as opposed to the respect they now receive from 
the police.2 The carrot and stick approach forecloses the options available to protestors. 
This contributes to what Pandian sees as a more fundamental form of institutionalisation. 
The Dalit parties, he argues, have bought into the idea that institutional politics is key: 
 
Since the 1990s Dalits have started their own parties. That was the main set back. 
Everyone sees 1990 as the time of great uprising. Of course there was an uprising, 
but no huge change in consciousness. You are realising this now. With the uprising 
there was a flaw. Post 1990s what the Dalit intellectuals said was that Dalit politics 
alone would rule India. What they meant by Dalit politics was electoral politics 
(Pandian Interview, April 2012). 
 
In this regard, the victory of Mayawati in UP, he insists, has further limited the Dalit 
political imagination to party politics and political power. Dalit parties, in other words, 
have been institutionalised into particular ways of doing politics that neglect the wider 
socio-cultural and economic contexts within which discrimination persists. ‘The time 
worn response to dissent’, Nandy asserts, ‘is to neutralise it by absorbing it into the 
mainstream’ (1998: 51). This neutralisation, it seems, extends to the political imaginaries 
of political challengers. 
 
                                                          
2 A politics of principle may have its own reward, but it is a costly and precarious process as 
the anti-nuclear protestors in Kudankulam found to their cost in 2012 when boys as young as 
15 were charged with sedition for their part in a peaceful protest against the commissioning of 
a nuclear reactor: http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Madurai/article3898050.ece 
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Acceptable Allies? 
The compulsions to enter politics, then, are powerful, but what of the VCK’s 
performance as a party? Many critics argued that the VCK should have kept away from 
established parties. Indeed, the Bahujan Samaj Party’s state secretary, Armstrong, 
insisted that a vote for the VCK was wasted because the Dalits who had been attracted 
away from the Dravidian parties by the promise of an alternative were shoring up those 
same parties through alliance politics (Personal Communication, September 2012). 
Others were even more cynical, arguing that the VCK now acted as the ‘SC/ST Wing of 
the DMK’. Just as Kanshiram – founder of the BSP - portrayed Dalit politicians as 
chamchas (stooges), so these critics argued that the VCK had done little more than get 
some of their people fielded as candidates. VCK supporters, themselves, were upset by 
their leader’s obsequious behaviour towards allies. I asked Thirumavalavan about this: 
 
H: Do you need to go and stand before politicians with your hands bowed? 
T: No. No compulsion at all. It is up to us. We can refuse to go and see them and 
maintain a party like Nedumaran [a Tamil nationalist politician] – 500 or so strong. 
H: But if you want to be a meaningful party? 
T: Then we need to observe certain protocols. Go and see Kalaignar Karunanidhi on 
his birthday and my birthday for instance. We also need to watch our language to 
some extent, things like that (Personal Exchange, August 2012). 
 
To insist that the VCK should stand independently, however, is to apply different 
standards to them than to others. The infinitely better resourced and established 
Communist parties, for instance, similarly feel the need to ally with the regional power-
holders. The common view is that the only way of making electoral gains is to ally with 
the major parties. As Thirumavalavan (2009: 266) wrote: ‘Contesting alone was 
considered, but it would be like clapping with one hand’. Working for the masses, he 
notes, may mean having to join hands with others even though no party in Tamil Nadu 
can be seen as a ‘true friend of the Dalits’ (Ibid: 28).  
 
In electoral terms, as Wyatt (2009: 129) notes, the results of these alliances are ‘very 
modest’. The VCK have won three seats in the Legislative Assembly and one Lok Sabha 
seat. The most they have won in any election is two seats at state level. Of their 
representatives, Thirumavalavan - the first VCK candidate to be elected - resigned his 
MLA seat on a point of principle (Thirumavalavan 2009). Of the two elected in 2006 one 
defected to another party. Only one of their three MLAs, therefore, has lasted a full term 
in office – Ravikumar represented Kattumannarkovil constituency from 2006 until his 
defeat in the 2011 elections. In 2013, therefore, Thirumavalavan, MP for Chidambaram, 
remains the sole elected representative of the VCK. 
 
Whilst the VCK has now been in alliance with both major parties: ‘we have not received 
full acceptance or recognition from either party. They totally see us as ‘just a Dalit party’ 
and it could take some time before that perception changes’ (Sannah Interview, 
September 2012). In an interview for the party magazine Tamil Mann (Tamil Land) 
Thirumavalavan expanded on this: 
 
Whenever non-Dalits start a party they can open branches wherever they like. They 
can campaign with independence. They can express their opinions without fear or 
favour. It is a huge struggle for the VCK to simply go to a place and raise a flag 
there. If we take up general issues than that is a problem too. We took out car rally 
 7 
from Batlagundu to Cumbam on the Mullaperiyar issue [The dam located in Kerala 
that is a source of constant disputes], but as soon as we entered Cumbam, dominant 
castes surrounded our vehicles and threw stones at us. We said that we were 
protesting on their behalf too, but their view is: ‘Who are you to speak up on this 
problem’ (Thirumavalavan 2011: 40-43) 
 
Similarly, numerous party members also pointed out how often their leader had called for 
a Third Front. In 2009, at the height of the crisis in Sri Lanka, for instance, he sought to 
forge a Tamil Nationalist Front but none would accept his leadership. There are 
pragmatic reasons to reject a Third Front, but the rejection was couched in caste terms. 
Institutionalisation here, therefore, is not simply the creation of a party and engagement 
with elections; it entails a radical change of political culture: educating both the Dalit 
masses and the other parties about political engagement.  
 
Whilst unfavourable comparisons have been drawn between the Vanniyar based Paatali 
Makkal Katchi’s (Toiling Peoples’ Party) electoral returns and those of the VCK (eg, 
Wyatt 2009: 130), such accounts do not tell the whole story. It is true that Paraiyars and 
Vanniyars have similar populations in the state, but we need to understand their 
respective performances in context. Firstly, the PMK was most successful before the 
VCK became an established party and eroded their vote-base. Since that point, the 
PMK’s electoral fortunes have declined. In 2011 the PMK managed to win only 3 of 30 
seats it contested despite standing in alliance with the VCK. Caste arithmetic suggested 
that this was an unassailable combination, but such calculations neglect wider political 
considerations. Most respondents noted that this was a loss for the DMK alliance as a 
whole rather than anything. Corruption scandals, accusations of nepotism and power cuts 
conspired to fuel an anti-incumbency wave. Within that broader framework, however, 
local contests saw a different logic at play: 
 
Dalit votes fell for non-Dalit candidates, but the votes of the non-Dalits were not 
cast for Dalit candidates. This is the backdrop and underlying reason for the VCK’s 
loss in 10 seats (Sannah Interview, September 2012).  
 
I was repeatedly told that caste played a factor in the elections. From this perspective, a 
purely political analysis of the VCK’s electoral performance is flawed since it neglects 
the social discrimination that Dalits continue to face, which can mean that non-Dalits 
refuse to vote for a Dalit party (Gorringe 2005).  
 
This is not to suggest that people automatically or necessarily vote for their caste. Indeed, 
Sannah noted that both Dalit and Vanniyar votes were divided. Whilst the PMK has been 
able to mobilise around 50% of the Vanniyar vote, Wyatt suggest that the VCK has not 
been able to emulate this success with regards to Paraiyar votes (Wyatt 2009: 130). 
Following Hickey and Du Toit (2007), however, we need to analyse the terms on which 
groups are included into institutions. The Dalit upsurge did not mobilise a previously 
excluded category so much as one lacking in political consciousness. This constituency, 
therefore, was already integrated into the political system albeit on the margins. Dalit 
parties, furthermore, emerged after those of other caste parties and – partly as a 
consequence – found key political positions and the status of most-favoured ally already 
occupied. Thirdly, Dalit parties lack the resources that other political challenges can 
muster. Fourthly, Dalits entered political institutions but were not able to shed their social 
identities and faced discrimination as a result: in 1999 cow-dung was smeared on the 
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posters of Dalit parties, in numerous elections non-Dalits refused to vote for them, and as 
late as 2012 party flag-poles were uprooted from village squares.  
 
Three key differences between the PMK and VCK stand out: firstly, the VCK has never 
mobilised Paraiyars on a caste basis – preferring instead to use the language of Dalits or 
Tamils instead. The PMK, by contrast, has been most successful when mobilising 
Vanniyars. Sure enough, following its electoral reversals, the PMK reverted to a politics 
of caste assertion in 2012 in a bid to boost its fortunes. The second point is that Dalit 
voters have long been integrated into political institutions thanks to the reservations for 
SC candidates. Dalits not only stand for all parties, therefore, but have long-standing ties 
and relations to particular parties that are hard to break. Consequently, as one social 
scientist noted; ‘After the PMK agitation then suddenly there were Vanniyars in both 
Dravidian parties in great numbers, but the same has not happened in this case’ (Bala, 
Personal Communication April 2012). Finally, the lack of resources means that the VCK 
are unable to cherry-pick constituencies or contest from the same number of seats as the 
PMK. As Thirumavalavan noted: ‘we do not have resources to bankroll candidates and so 
we are very much at a disadvantage in negotiations’ (Personal Communication, 
September 2012). 
 
Despite this, Dalit concerns have been institutionalised to some degree. One spill-over 
(Whittier 2004) from the emergence of Dalit parties has been a focus on caste by 
Communist Parties. Samuel Raj, a leader of the CPI(M) affiliated Tamil Nadu 
Untouchability Eradication Front conceded that the Dalit parties were instrumental in the 
forcing the party to rethink its strategy. Their focus was on the economic exploitation of 
the working class, but the Dalit parties forced them to consider whether Dalits should 
‘have to live in social oppression till they get economic liberty’ (Samuel Raj Interview, 
April 2012). Whilst none of the other parties have so explicitly addressed Dalit demands, 
they have arguably been more receptive to them. If the police firing that killed 6 Dalits in 
Paramkudi in 2011 indicated the entrenched casteism of police forces in an area 
characterised by Backward (but dominant) Caste Thevar clashes with Dalit Pallars, 
subsequent events suggest that the tide might be turning. In 2012, several attacks on 
Thevars generated a feeling of insecurity amongst them as reflected by the formation of 
the Thevar Inam Paadukarpu Peravai (Thevar Caste Protection Front) (Dhanraj, personal 
communication, October 2012). Later that year, the Thevar leader ‘Prabakaran was 
arrested … on charges of creating animosity between two groups in Kamuthi and 
Mudukulathur by making provocative speeches, distributing pamphlets and by posting 
write ups in his website “marathamizhar.blog.com”, denigrating Dalit leaders’ (The 
Hindu 2012). Subsequently, in early 2013, the AIADMK government responded to caste 
violence by Vanniyars against Dalits by clamping down on the PMK and even placing its 
leader under arrest (The Hindu 2013). Dalit parties and voters, thus, may be starting to 
shape the institutions they joined in the late 1990s. 
 
Rebels in Power? 
If political institutions are shifting in response to Dalit participation, how have Dalit 
parties and politicians themselves changed? We have seen how the Dalit parties are 
imperfectly integrated into Tamil politics, but given that new parties seek new gains in 
politics we should ask what have they achieved through their electoral engagement. The 
most obvious way in which parties can effect change is through interventions in the 
elected chambers. It is not, however, straight-forward for a single MP or MLA to gain 
time and space in Parliament. Respondents mentioned Ravikumar MLA speaking on a 
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range of issues from housing, to debt, pornography, prohibition, the rights of transgenders 
and food for prisoners (Tamizh Murasu & TamizhKanni, Personal Communication, 
March 2012).3 Others noted Thirumavalavan’s fasts and speeches on Tamil issues – 
relating to the violence in Sri Lanka or the allocation of water for Tamil Nadu. In 2012, 
however, his most vociferous intervention came on the subject of a cartoon in a NCERT 
(National Council of Educational Research and Training) textbook that was said to 
denigrate Dr Ambedkar – first law minister of India and pre-eminent Dalit leader. In 
Parliament Thirumavalavan launched a tirade at the publishers and a demand for the 
withdrawal of the cartoon and an apology in a speech that sparked a national debate.  
 
That one intervention, a speaker at a VCK memorial in June argued, justified his 5 year 
term (Fieldnotes, June 2012). Others, however, castigated Dalit leaders for their focus on 
issues of identity (Teltumbde 2012), or for their silence: 
 
6 minutes he spoke on that [Ambedkar cartoon]. 6 minutes. After that – again the 
Eelam [Tamil nation in Sri Lanka] problem and the UN resolution. That is all. After 
that he never opened his mouth. For that matter no one opened their mouths – we 
have 110 stooges there [referring to reserved MPs] (Anon Interview, April 2012).    
 
In the eyes of such critics, Dalit politicians merely prop up established parties or enrich 
themselves. Perhaps, though, the expectations of those who were mobilised by 
Thirumavalavan’s fiery speeches in the 1990s are over-optimistic. As one more tempered 
interviewee noted, when asked what he expected from the party: 
 
Not much – they are a small outfit with just one MP what do you expect them to 
do? They need to give us a voice and raise our issues and try and get political power 
– this is what they are doing (Ambedkar Interview, June 2012) 
 
An otherwise critical union worker said that no other politician had spoken up on behalf 
of conservancy workers: 
 
Even those who are government employees did not have a set wage – they were 
paid different amounts at the panchayat level, the regional level and state level and 
in different institutions. The village workers would have to work for left-overs or 
face caste wrath. After years of campaigning to highlight their plight, including 
conferences and protests and a huge rally in Chennai under the auspices of the 
communist parties, I finally approached Thirumavalavan who listened to the issues 
and raised them in the media and then Ravikumar raised them in the Legislative 
Assembly with the result that an order was passed to give the workers a minimum 
standard wage of Rs 3000 a month (Kondavelai Interview, April 2012). 
 
Whilst this interviewee was sympathetic towards the VCK and offered a rosier picture of 
this event than others, it should come as no surprise that he approached the VCK, nor that 
they raised the issue (see Ravikumar 2011). As one Dalit academic, who was a fierce 
critic of VCK politics, conceded; if I needed to speak to an MLA or MP then the VCK 
                                                          
3 In 2011 Ravikumar published a book of his Assembly Speeches to counter the frequent charges that 
the VCK did not speak up on issues. They include speeches on panchami land, Sri Lanka, water-tank 
workers and employment opportunities – many of which gained no coverage at all. 
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‘are the only ones I have any sort of access to, so yes I guess I would turn to them’. 
‘Political entrepreneurs’, as Wyatt (2009: 87) puts it, ‘function as mediators’ or brokers. 
Such brokerage often has negative connotations. As activist and writer Raj Gowthaman 
remarked: ‘Once they enter electoral politics they [movements] become mere vehicles for 
distributing goods to members’ (Personal Communication, April 2012).4 Certainly I 
encountered many Dalits who credited the VCK with obtaining jobs, transfers or land 
deeds for them, but as the quote from Kondavelai above indicates, mediation may be on 
behalf of groups as well as individuals. Such mediation, significantly, has come to be 
expected of all parties. ‘Tamil politics’, as academic and activist Lakhsmanan argues, 
‘de-politicises the masses’ through hand-outs and patron-client relations (Personal 
Communication, March 2012).To gain benefits and concessions of this nature requires 
the VCK to negotiate or bargain with officials and other parties.  
 
Getting things done, in other words, requires institutionalisation into the informal politics 
of the state. Early in 2012 I attended a party wedding. 
 
My attention was drawn towards the veshti’s (traditional waistcloths) that the men 
were wearing. Several sported red, white and blue lines printed down the edges thus 
identifying them as VCK supporters. Others wore their affiliations literally on their 
sleeves as well. One attendee sported the black shirt and veshti with black border of 
the Dravida Kazhagham, others had DMK colours. … One late comer was ushered 
in to sit pride of place on the stage behind Thirumavalavan. When he got up to talk, 
I was told that he was a bigshot in the AIADMK (Fieldnotes, February 2012). 
 
The VCK, thus, had institutional attire and had also forged ties to members of other 
parties. Whilst reservations mean that there are Dalits in every party, the VCK had gone 
beyond networks of relations. The Madurai District secretary, for instance, not only 
invited DMK strong-man and Karunanidhi’s son Azhagiri to her housewarming, she was 
in turn invited to his son’s wedding. My host at the wedding above explained that: 
 
The VCK have gone beyond the stage of being purely oppositional and become a 
proper party now with recognition from all the others. They all have to work 
together to get things done and so they make such visits and shows of respect 
(Fieldnotes, February 2012). 
 
Dhanapal, a building contractor who has been a member of the VCK for a decade now, 
spoke of how the movements’ characterisation as extremist used to sideline their 
concerns. Now, he insisted, they have the authority to make themselves heard: 
 
Now that we are a party, if we want to hold a protest we get a response from 
officials, our voices are heard, we have the opportunity to interact with alliance 
partners. We’ve been in the DMK Front and the ADMK Front and so can speak to 
District Convenors and officials in each district or area. Now the VCK District 
Convenor and the DMK District Convenor and ADMK convenor have links. So 
what happens with these connections is that we can deploy them in the interests of 
                                                          
4 For an example of how patronage networks operate see: 
http://www.thehindu.com/news/cities/Madurai/watchmen-sweepers-hired-on-political-
recommendation-school-department/article5090201.ece  
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the people. If someone comes to us, we can contact the district convenor by phone 
and they say ‘Right, I’ll look into it’ and they facilitate things (Interview, March 
2012). 
 
The informal and mediated nature of how things get done in Tamil politics is captured 
here. Whilst Dhanapal, who had applied for a post in the party, put this in a positive light 
others were more critical. Raj Gowthaman, however, notes that this is not confined to 
Dalit parties: 
 
You know what Tamil politics is like – you need connections to get things done. 
The Dalit parties do not have much clout on their own, which is why they need 
coalition partners. Now the DMK [the VCK’s coalition partner at the time] is in 
opposition – they will have to sit quiet for five years. That is what it is like 
(Personal Communication, April 2012). 
 
At a seminar on Raj Gowthaman’s work the discussion turned to Dalit politics. The 
frustrations of disillusioned intellectuals as well as their recognition of the wider political 
culture within which Dalit parties must operate were captured in a humorous exchange: 
 
M: The start [for Dalit Parties] was good, but since joining politics they have 
stagnated and started to mimic all the other parties. Yesterday there was a shooting 
[of Dalits] in Paramakudi which the leaders condemned, but today there is an 
election and so they join an alliance. What do the leaders think of the people? What 
are they talking?  
In response to this rhetorical question one wag shouted out ‘politics’ and the room 
erupted into laughter (Fieldnotes, April 2012). 
 
Institutionalisation into backroom politics has enabled the VCK to secure land deeds and 
jobs and ensure that party officials now get respect from police officials. The problems 
for Dalit critics of the VCK come when the ties forged to other party leaders and groups 
lead the party into the murkier aspects of politics. As one leading lawyer in Madurai 
observed: 
 
Now that they are a party they are in contact with other party leaders. Many of the 
accused [in Prevention of Atrocity cases] will have party connections and so 
pressure is put on this lot to drop cases or come to some agreement (Vakil 
Interview, July 2012). 
 
The term used to describe this is the English word ‘compromise’. The alliances and links 
with other parties, I was repeatedly told, mean that it is harder for the VCK to stand firm 
against caste discrimination or violence. They are put under pressure by officials, allies 
and dominant castes to effect a compromise between perpetrator and victim. VCK leaders 
insist that they would never sell out in such fashion ‘especially not for serious cases’, but 
concede that some ‘miscreants’ in the party might do so. Given the lack of a salary for 
party workers the temptation is certainly huge. Others justified informal settlements in 
relatively minor cases pointing out that such deals secured rapid compensation and saved 
lengthy and uncertain legal procedures and fees and avoided animosity between groups. 
As the party propaganda secretary, Gautham Sannah, argued: 
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In some villages there are minor or petty confrontations and we also have the 
responsibility to ensure that we engage in dialogue to prevent these small problems 
from escalating into major caste clashes. You see the Panthers can make a fuss and 
then leave the village, but the villagers there need to live in peace. We cannot allow 
the problems caused by a few to adversely affect the entire village. In those 
situations we have to resolve matters through dialogue there is not other option. In 
those situations one or two frustrated people might come and accuse us of 
compromise (Interview, September 2012). 
 
Having repeatedly encountered rural Dalits’ distress over long-drawn out and expensive 
(both in terms of travel and lost earnings) legal proceedings and heard fearful Dalits voice 
their trepidation about Dalit activists stirring up a hornets’ nest before leaving, Sannah’s 
argument is sound. To many, however, the very idea of any settlement is an anathema. 
VCK cadres in Periyaoor Cheri near Madurai printed sports shirts bearing the motto ‘no 
compromise’ to celebrate the village temple festival. Activists nurtured on the slogan ‘hit 
back’, are appalled by any suggestion of shady deals letting culprits off the hook. 
 
Increasingly, these critics argue, members of the party are using their new-found power 
to better themselves rather than the community. Social movements everywhere have been 
seen as vehicles for the advancement of activists (Meyer & Tarrow 1998) and the VCK is 
said to be no exception. Such tales are hard to verify and very few concrete cases were 
mentioned. Whilst the VCK is now routinely said to be engaged in katta panchayats 
(kangaroo courts) that resolve issues informally with money changing hands, 
Thirumavalavan contested such rumours:  
 
I have heard that, but is there any proof? Also, all parties do this why are we the 
ones who are singled out? This is the result of jealousy and an attempt to break 
party. Give me details of one instance where we have compromised (Personal 
Communication, September 2012). 
 
When I mentioned one party member who told me he was elected as Panchayat president 
having promised to resolve any caste issues without recourse to the Prevention of 
Atrocities Act, Thirumavalavan insisted that party cadre would not countenance this and 
asserted that ‘we can never compromise on atrocities’.  
 
Many of the rumours and misinformation are prompted by jealousy. Whilst other parties 
are clearly more involved in kangaroo courts and real-estate, the fact that many VCK 
officials are now relatively well-off, grates with those left behind and with other castes. 
Empowering India, for instance, notes that Ravikumar – General Secretary of the Party 
and MLA from 2006 to 2011 – registered assets worth Rs 401, 155 in 2006. When he 
stood again in 2011, this figure had risen to Rs 4, 719, 496.5 Whilst there is no suggestion 
of wrongdoing here, and it should be stressed that this is chickenfeed compared to the 
Karnataka Election Watch (in Manor 2013: 52) finding that ‘the average MLA is worth 
23.54 crore’ in Karnataka, it reinforced people’s conviction that politics was a business. 
‘All these forms of brokerage’ as activist and intellectual Paari Chezhian observed, ‘are 
very lucrative’ (Personal Communication, February 2012). He pointed to kangaroo 
                                                          
5 http://www.empoweringindia.org/new/constituency.aspx?eid=740&cid=159 
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courts, land estate deals and other forms of mediation as means to make money. The 
widespread practice of spending money in elections follows the belief that such 
investment could be recouped through taking a cut of any contract or deal requiring 
official approval. VCK candidates for local body elections spoke of spending several 
hundred thousand (lakh) rupees on their campaigns: on posters, food for volunteers, 
leaflets and money for voters.  
 
Pavalar Talaiyari (a pen name), writing for the VCK’s Tamil Mann, recognised that 
money could not buy elections but that it was widely used: 
 
It is not just money that determines victory or success. Coalition strength, party, 
strength, individual authority all determine victory. Only in fourth place is money. 
Despite all this the shameful practice of giving money for votes has been 
established (2011: 44). 
 
He called for major electoral reform, but pending that, many VCK candidates appear to 
have adapted to existing practices. The VCK, as one Dalit publisher noted, has become a 
mirror image of the Dravidian parties (Ezhuthallar, Personal Communication, March 
2012). Contesting the worst accusations, a legal advocate insisted that one cannot make 
vast sums of money from Dalit constituents and suggested that real-estate was a more 
likely source of income (Jawahar Interview, March 2012). Underpinning the rumours was 
the fact that the need to amass wealth like the other parties had become important for the 
VCK and helped fuel attempts to take the party ‘into the mainstream’. As the VCK 
branches out and incorporates ever more non-Dalits it increasingly protests on more 
general issues, which is a sore point for some: 
 
Now Dalit leaders are protesting about price hikes and so on. That is fine. They can 
hold a general meeting and condemn Congress, but they should remember that they 
are a community party. When they hold a ‘general meeting’ who turns up? Dalits 
only, so these parties should address their problems first and foremost (Manickam, 
Interview, June 2012) 
 
Thirumavalavan rightly insisted that the VCK, unlike established parties, protested on 
both these and Dalit issues, but the perception of a party growing away from its core 
constituents persists at the grassroots. 
 
Conclusion: Just another party? 
When insurgency wells up, apparently uncontrollable, elites respond. And one of their 
responses is to cultivate those lower-class organisations which begin to emerge in such 
periods, for they have little to fear from organisations, especially from organisations 
which come to depend on them for support. Thus, however unwittingly, leaders and 
organisers of the lower classes act in the end to facilitate the efforts of elites to channel 
the insurgent masses into normal politics, believing all the while that they are taking the 
long and arduous but certain path to power (Piven and Cloward 1979: xxii). 
 
The VCK, as the quote from Piven and Cloward reminds us, are not alone in managing 
the fraught process of institutionalisation. Like many before them, they have experienced 
both the benefits and costs of the process. Whilst members have signed up in droves, 
many core activists have become increasingly disillusioned. Having entered politics the 
VCK have found that they could not stand independently. For all their emphasis on 
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maintaining autonomy and respect, therefore, some compromises have been made. One 
of the main changes to the party has been the decision in 2007 to admit non-Dalits to 
leadership posts and the related emphasis on Tamil nationalism as a unifying force. This 
change has given the VCK a toe-hold in villages that they could not think of entering in 
the past, but that has come at the price of a growing unease amongst supporters. As one 
academic commentator concluded:  
 
At one stage there were hopes that the VCK would be different – they did create 
great awareness and introduce some ideas, but that has now come to nothing. They 
have become another party – another middle man (Perarsareer, Personal 
Communication, March 2012). 
 
Institutionalisation, however, is not a one-off, once-and-for-all process, but a gradual 
adaptation to a prevalent political culture. Despite over a decade in politics, the VCK 
have yet to formalise structures of leadership or membership and remain, in this sense, 
very much ‘a political movement trying to become a political party’ (Ravikumar, 
Personal Communication, August 2013). This was perhaps best illustrated when the VCK 
decided to emulate all other Tamil parties by launching its own TV channel. Lacking 
resources, the VCK hit on the idea of celebrating Thirumavalavan’s 50th birthday by 
collecting gold from members. Rarely can the funding for a channel have been collected 
so transparently. For all the criticisms of the direction taken by the party and, more 
specifically, some of its functionaries, supporters responded to the call with enthusiasm 
and purpose. There was a real sense of ownership pertaining to the party and the 
prospective channel that belie suggestions of the party’s demise. It is no small matter that 
Dalits now have people in authority who they can turn to, relate to and interact with. 
Tamil politics in that sense has been democratised by the institutionalisation of the 
Panthers.  
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